Introduction
SOBER-t16 and SOBER-t32 are synchronous additive stream ciphers designed for key sizes upto 128 bit and 256 bits, respectively. The SOBER ciphers were submitted by Philip Hawkes and Gregory Rose at Qualcomm Australia.
Description
The stream ciphers are constructed from a linear feedback shift register (LF SR), a non-linear filter (N LF ) and a form of irregular decimation, called stuttering. SOBER-t16 outputs the key stream as 16 bit blocks and SOBER-t32 emits 32 bit blocks. The LF SR of the ciphers are of length 17 and operate over GF (2 16 ) for SOBER-t16 and GF (2 32 ) for SOBER-t32, respectively. The N LF consists of XOR (⊕), addition modulo 2 16 ( ) (addition modulo 2 32 ) and a 16-to-16 (32-to-32) bit transformation called f -function. The output of the non-linear filter at time t is described as N LF (t) = ((f (s t s t+16 ) s t+1 s t+6 ) ⊕ const) s t+13 where s t+k is the content of the k'th shift register cell at time t, const is a session key dependent constant value, derived during the key loading phase.
The stuttering decimates the output of the N LF in an irregular fashion. For the stuttering of SOBER-t16 it can be shown that there is an average of
Linear Feedback Shift Register
The linear recurrence over GF (2 16 ) of the SOBER-t16 LF SR can be shown, see [Her85] , to be equivalent to implementing 16 parallel bit-wise LF SR's, each of length 17 · 16 = 272. These linear recurrences are all the same, represented by the primitive polynomial p 16 (x) over GF (2): The period of the corresponding 32 linear feedback shift sequences generated by p 32 (x) is thus 2 544 − 1 and so the period of the recurrence over GF (2 32 ) must be also 2 544 − 1. It is very likely that the output of the N LF has period 2 272 − 1 for SOBER-t16 and 2 544 − 1 for SOBER-t32, respectively. With the succeeding irregular decimation we get therefore an avergage key stream period of 6 13 · 2 272 − 1 for SOBER-t16 and an average period of 12 25 · 2 544 − 1 for SOBER-t32.
Properties of the SOBER f -function
The f -function is part of the non-linear filter N LF . The f -function of SOBER-t16 has the following property, that for 16 bit input word
So, modifications of the 8 least significant input bits of f only affects the 8 least significant output bits, no bit changes are carried to the 8 most significant output bits. For SOBER-t32 the f -function has similar properties. For 32 bit input word x = (x HH ||x HL ||x LH ||x LL ) we have
Modifications of the 24 least significant input bits of f only affects the 24 least significant output bits, no bit changes are carried to the 8 most significant output bits. It is rather unclear how to exploit these properties for attacking the ciphers.
In order to get correlations of key stream bits with bits of the LF SR, it could be useful to compute a linear approximation of the f -function. Table 1 shows the linear approximations of the corresponding bit functions of the SOBER-t16 f -function f = (f 1 , . . . , f 16 ).
bit function prob. of best linear approximation correlation immunity best correlator prob. of best correla- Table 1 . bit functions of the SOBER-t16 f -function f = (f1, . . . , f16)
Properties of the SOBER s-boxes
The s-boxes of SOBER-t16 and SOBER-t32 are combinations of the skipjack s-box and tailordesigned s-boxes of the Information Security Research Centre (ISRC) at the Queenslang University of Technology. For the 8-to-16 bit s-box of SOBER-t16 we have for all 8 bit inputs x
and for the 8-to-24 bit s-box of SOBER-t32
where holds with probability p = 0.609.
The differential analysis gave only small deviations of the distributions of input differences to output differences. For instance, the input difference ∆input = (90) 16 is carried to output difference ∆output = (b1) 16 with probability p = 0.0468. holds with probability p = 0.641. The differential analysis of the isrc1 s-box gave only small deviations of the distributions of input differences to output differences. For instance, the input difference ∆input = (82) 16 is carried to the output difference ∆output = (ac) 16 with probability p = 0.038. holds with probability p = 0.695.
Tap sets of the N LF and LF SR
In [Gol96] some necessary security requirements of tap positions of non-linear filter functions were given. For instance, -the difference of the last tap position and the first tap position should be as long as possible, i.e. maximal the length of the linear feedback shift register -the difference set of the tap sequence should be a full positive difference set -the greatest common divisors of two pairwise different tap positions should be one These requirements defeat inversion attacks [Gol96] and correlation attacks [And95, Gol96] . Table 2 shows the tap sets and the correspnding difference tap sets of the SOBER ciphers for the LF SR and for the N LF . It is easy to see, that the difference tap set of the LF SR and the tap set T difference tap set ∆T LF SR TLF SR = {0, 4, 15, 17}
∆TLF SR = {2, 4, 11, 13, 15, 17} N LF TNLF = {0, 1, 6, 13, 16} ∆TNLF = {1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16} Table 2 . tap set and difference tap set of the LF SR and the N LF N LF are indeed full positive difference sets. In order to provide sufficent resistance against guess-and-determine attacks [HR00] , the tap position of the LF SR are well-suited to the taps of the N LF .
Theoretical attacks
In [Gol96] a necessary security requirement of a filter generator is that the LF SR length n and the algebraic order k of the non-linear filter function should be large enough so that of such products. With roughly twice of that many observed key stream bytes (∼ 65 giga-bytes ), we can solve a linear equation system in that many variables. Strassens's matrix inversion algorithm [Str69, Bab01] has complexity 7 · n 2.807 − 6 · n 2 , therefore we get a time complexity of O(2 101 ).
With the solution of these linear equations we get at most 35 bits of the length 17 linear feedback shift register over GF (2 16 ), i.e. 6 bits of the least significant bit LF SR and the bits of two full register cells of the LF SR over GF (2 16 ). In order to get more bits we can proceed as follows. We drop the first one of the 34359737737 least significant output bits of the N LF , clock the LF SR once more, get the next least significant output bit and solve the simultaneous equations again. So, after only 11 additional clocks, and by exploiting the linear feedback recurrence, we can restore 17 consecutive LF SR output words.
Of course, we can extend this idea to all remaining output bit functions of the N LF . But due to the s-box and the carry propagation of the modulo addition the number of products increases dramatically.
In order to avoid the gigantic requirements of the theoretical attack described above, we need a boolean function with n input bits and an algebraic order of k, so that solving a binary system of k i=0 n i linear equations is still feasible. For instance, the function x 11 ⊕x 9 ⊕x 1 is a linear approximation of the least significant bit f 1 (x) of the f -function, which holds with probability p = 0.5313. Therefore we get an boolean approximation of the least significant bit of the N LF with 22 input bits and with algebraic order of 11.
With time complexity of O(2 63 ) and roughly 4 mega-byte key stream we can solve these linear equations, which hold only with a certain probability.
Correlation Attacks
The submitters claim that due to the non-linear filter and the irregular decimation of the key stream correlation attacks are very unlikely.
The least significant output bit of a modulo addition is not connected to any carry bit, so this property could be a good starting point for an attack. If we can find a correlation of output bits of the N LF with a linear combination of least siginificat bit taps of the LF SR, we can launch a correlation attack to the least significant bit LF SR introduced in section 3.2. But unfortunately, the least significant bit input of the f -function, is correlated only with probability 1 2 to the least significant bit output of f , which is completely useless.
The relationship between the LF SR over GF (2 16 ) and the corresponding 16 bit-wise LF SR's over GF (2) could be very useful. For SOBER-t16, instead of attacking the full length 17 LF SR over GF (2 16 ), it may suffice to attack only the first 17 bits of each of the 16 bit-wise LF SR over GF (2). In [CJS00] two fast correlation attacks are described which are very effective in restoring only the first part of a linear feedback shift register, i.e. the first 17 bits of one of the bit-wise LF SR described above. Table 3 shows the required correlation probabilities with given maximal key stream length 2
50
for an correlation attack of the bit-wise LF SR faster than exhaustive key search with key size of 256 bit. Table 3 . complexities for correlation attacks to the bit-wise LF SR's
Timing Attacks and Power Attacks
Due to the irregular decimation the cipher is vulnerable to timing and power attacks. However, the submitters claim that even if the decimation could be strip away the cipher remains secure. In [GM91, GP92, Ziv91] attacks to irregularly decimated sequences were introduced, but due to the non-linear filter these attacks don't seem very promising.
Key Loading, Rekeying and Weak Keys
The key loading is the crucical part of the SOBER cipher. This mechanism maps the session key material to the initial state of the SOBER ciphers. The submitters report that the key loading was designed in a way that every bit of the initial state is a non-linear function of every bit of the session key.
The ciphers provide an initialization vector, called frame key, which can be assumed to be public. In SOBERII, an ancestor of SOBER-t16 and SOBER-t32 with very similar structure, a correlation between related frames for the same initial key material was found [BP99] . But the updated key and frame loading used in SOBER-t16 and SOBER-t32 destroys this correlation.
If the initial state is completely zero then the algorithms will cycle forever producing the same N LF output. But the probability that a session key results in the initial state being the all zero state is less than 2 −112 for SOBER-t16 and less than 2 −256 for SOBER-t32. With probability 2 −16 for SOBER-t16, 2 −32 for SOBER-t32, the constant parameter const in the N LF computation, see section 2, is zero. But firstly it is unknown how this property can be exploited for an attack, and secondly we can't predict keys which will result in const = 0.
Distinguishing Attacks
The attack is successful if one can distinguish the generated pseudo-random sequences from truly random sequences. The NESSIE-Tools were applied to SOBER-t16 and SOBER-t32 with 128 bit key size. However, the results didn't indicated a deviation from random behaviour. For more details please refer to [Dic01a, Dic01b] .
Conclusion
The submitters claim that exhaustive key search is the most efficient way of attacking SOBER-t16 and SOBER-t32. The best known attacks, different from exhaustive key search, have complexity of 2 160 for SOBER-t16 and 2 320 for SOBER-t32.
